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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(a) Thayn's response to GRCC's statement of facts. 
1. GRCC states in f 4 "the heavily sediment laden water from the Green River moves 
slowly through the system and sediment settles out onto the bottom of the canal, 
citing (R. 1902 V. 8, p.37). However, this reference was to the raceway, not GRCC's 
canal. The cited testimony refers to sluice gates which are in the raceway - NOT 
GRCC's canal. GRCC further states the canal must be kept full to "provide water at 
the top of the canal's banks where many of the shareholders inlets are located", citing 
R. 1902, V.l, pp. 148-149. This factual citation is incorrect.1 
2. f 8 of GRCC's statement of facts does not appear in this record and is false. Suffice 
it to say, Thayn has no "sluicing right" contained in his 35 cfs consumptive right, as 
there is no outlet from his "42 foot canal" except upon his own property for irrigation 
purposes.2 Thayn does possess a 600 cfs year round non-consumptive right for 
pumping and power generation purposes. 
3. In response to GRCC's statement of fact No. 12, ^ [6 of the 1952 agreement did not 
Obviously, like every other canal company, one puts in "checks" or "dams" to raise the 
level of the ditch for irrigation purposes to the particular shareholder. Otherwise the head loss of 
31 some users would deplete all users ability to irrigate. Jack Erwin testified that GRCC used to 
maintain checks in their canal. (R. 1902, V. 6, p. 78). 
2In reality, as counsel for GRCC knows, GRCC's water right has both a maximum flow 
restriction (cfs) and a total acre foot limitation. Once a party has consumed his total acre foot 
limit for the year, he has no additional flow. GRCC has a total irrigated acreage of 1443 (R. 
1369) yet has a maximum 60 cfs right, inclusive of 20 cfs for stock watering and domestic 
consumption. GRCC has a total acre foot limitation of 5904 any one season (R. 1369) for all 
purposes. The ruling of Judge Bryner, however, gives GRCC 80 cfs for the entire season 
without any acre foot limitation whatsoever before Thayn gets any water. (R. 1670, f 3). 
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specify any specific quantity of water to GRCC as stated in |12 of GRCC s statement 
of facts. That statement is false. (No citation to the record was made). | 1 of the 
1952 amendment does not purport to say what "GRCC s understanding and practice" 
was - nor does it in any manner reference how GRCC came up with its claim of 80 
cfs. In fact, the record below is devoid of such testimony.3 
4. f^ 13 is denied as written. GRCC has no measuring devise to know what their history 
and practice is. 
5. 1} 14 of GRCC's brief is not cited to any reference in the record and is denied as 
computed by GRCC's counsel.4 This is a mere attempt to introduce new evidence, 
untested by cross examination of any witness, into the Supreme Court record, but 
appearing nowhere in the record below. GRCC seems to be saying it needs 66.02 cfs 
"sluicing" for a consumptive right of merely 13.98 cfs actual water right.5 
6. In response to Tfl6 of GRCC's statement of facts, it is true Thayn examined the 1952 
agreement at or near the time he purchased the property and water right from Wilson. 
3GRCC has never even applied for a non-consumptive sluicing right of any type or 
nature. (See, R. 294-297; R. 1369). This "sluicing" right is a creature of this lawsuit, invented 
to attempt to justify claiming water over and above its state approved rights. Ironically, GRCC 
irrigates 1443.5 acres, with a per annum duty of 5774 acre foot limit on the irrigation. (R. 1369). 
What is really being sought by GRCC under the guise of "Sluicing" is water stealing, an 
unlimited right of GRCC's large shareholders to take all they desire to the detriment of junior 
water rights. 
4U. R. A. P. Rule 24(7) requires all statements of fact to be supported by citations to the 
record below. 
5Applying this ratio, every water right holder should be entitled to increase his claim by 
472% for "sluicing". 
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Thayn had no notice of the 1952 amendment until after the renovation of the pump 
house and building of the power plant in August of 1992. (R. 1659, Par. 15). 
7. In response to GRCC's fl7, GRCC cites R. 1902 V.4, pp. 7-12 for the proposition 
that "at the time of the change application (for 600 cfs) no measurement of the water 
being diverted had ever been made nor would they be made for more than a decade". 
(Applee's brief, p. 7). However, the actual testimony of Lee Thayn, upon question 
by Mr. Smith was to whether the first measurement of Thayn's water use was in 
1997, was answered "I don't know that". (R. V. 4, p. 90, TfljlO-12).6 
8. In response to GRCC's assertion in fact no. 18 that Thayn was receiving 753 and 463 
cfs on the dates in question, the record cited to does not support GRCC's conclusion. 
Mike Millard took 3 measurements, which showed the raceway to have 797 cfs on 
May 5 and 826 on May 6 at about noon. Nowhere does Millard conclude from those 
measurements, nor could one, exactly what Thayn receives.7 Rather, what these 
6GRCC misconstrues the application process. Initially, an application to appropriate 
water is filed. "The State Engineers Office checks it for accuracy and completeness" and then 
advertises the application in a paper. (Jack Barnett, R. 1902, V. 7, p. 9). U.C.A. 73-3-16(8) 
allows each applicant "to file a verified statement to the effect that the applicant had completed 
the appropriation" and elects to file a statement of water users claim "in lieu of proof of 
appropriation." U.C.A. 73-3-16. Wilson filed an election in order to "allow the state to 
determine what his use has been." (R. 1902 V. 7, p. 14, 10-16). There is no statute requiring the 
State Engineer to file written evidence of the examination made by his office. Mark Page, 
regional engineer for the Price, Utah division of water rights testified that the Thayns "water 
rights are in order and they are recognized by the state." (R. 1902, V. 9, p. 246). Page further 
testified that he was aware on the very day the 1981 change application was filed that Thayns 
intended to generate commercial hydro electric power (Id. at 242). 
7Millard did not measure what water loss occurs at the radial sluice gates. Without that 
measurement, no one can mathematically determine what Thayn gets. 
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measurements do show is the raceway has more than adequate capacity to satisfy both 
parties needs, if properly maintained. 
9. In response to TJ19, GRCC chose not to protest Wilson's application because he was 
a "good ole boy". (R. 1902, V. 1, p. 47). 
10. In response to |21 of GRCC's facts, Thayn responds that the National Hydro 
agreement did not fix the existing total capacity of the raceway, only an estimate of 
"about 600 cfs"). Moreover, what the measurements of GRCC's own expert show 
is there is more than a 600 cfs capacity in the raceway. GRCC also asserts that it was 
to receive a royalty solely for the use of the facilities. (Appelle's brief, p. 9). This 
is another falsehood. Under the National Hydro contract, GRCC was to provide the 
land for construction of a power plant south of Thayn's existing pump house, (Ex. 46, 
TfA), was to use its efforts to obtain easements for widening of the raceway (Ex. 46, 
Tf2) and withdraw their protest to the Thayn water right application for 1400 cfs non-
consumptive use. (Ex. 46, ^fl). No royalty was proposed merely for the use of the 
existing facilities; rather, the royalty payment to GRCC was only upon the power 
supply over and above Thayn's existing 600 cfs use. (See Ex. 46, Tfl2). Thayns were 
not contributing a royalty on the 600 cfs right they already had, because both Thayn 
and GRCC then understood that was Thayn's existing water right.8 
11. | 30 of GRCC's statement is misleading. Leon Thayn did say they were going to 
8All parties understood Thayn's 600 power right was to be excluded in the compensation 
to GRCC. (R. 1902, V. 1, pp. 91-92 [Dean King]; V. 4, pp. 76, 102 [Lee Thayn]; V. 2, p. 58 
[Leon Thayn]). 
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generate power for their own use, nothing about pumping water (R. 1902, V. 3, pp. 
176-191), meaning in essence, they would only be using their existing 600 cfs water 
right, not paying a royalty. 
12. In TJ32 of GRCC's statement of facts, GRCC states Thayn had completed various 
facilities prior to the time the decision was made in the spring of 1990 to go ahead 
with a hydro electric plant, citing (R. 1902, V. 4, pp. 7-8). In fact, Thayn testified 
exactly the opposite, that they had started working on those various portions of the 
renovation "primarily just for the pumping system" although some parts thereof could 
serve a dual purpose. GRCC's statement of the facts is erroneous.9 The record 
citations in f32 do not uphold the statements made by GRCC. 
13. Tf33 or GRCC's statement of facts is denied as written. A review of the citations 
shows GRCC's witnesses varied in time as to when that conversation took place from 
the fall of 1991 (R. 1902, V.5,142:1-143.7) to sometime in 1990 (R. 1902, V. 1,221, 
25). Moreover, as cited in Thayn's original brief, numerous board members, 
shareholder and agents of GRCC knew the hydroelectric facilities were being built.10 
(Thayn's brief, pp. 53-55). Leon denied ever telling either Vetere such a statement. 
9GRCC cites (R. 1902, V. 3, p. 143, L. 4-6) as proof Thayn had "decided to purchase a 
second turbine generator" prior to June 1990. (GRCC brief, p. 12). That testimony reads: "Q: 
When did you locate equipment that was needed for this project? A: As I recall, about the middle 
part of 1990". 
10Tim Vetere was not a GRCC board member until 1991, at which time he searched and 
found GRCC knew something was going to happen at the power plant. (R. 1902, V. 6, p. 102). 
Blaine Silliman, board member of GRCC from 1989-1991, and president form 1991-1993 knew 
of the power plant construction and actually helped build it. (R. 1902, V. 1, pp. 126-132). 
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(R. 1902, V. 3, pp. 4-5). 
14. In response to GRCC's p 4 , Thayn denies the statement that Thayn's use of the pump 
house caused severe water fluctuations. The citations to the record, in fact, establish 
that the fluctuations were due to "the low period", i.e. July and August. (R. 1902, V. 
1, p. 91, 3-6). Further, that after a meeting with Thayns, the problem was "worked 
out". (R. 1902, V. 1, p. 217, 19-20; p. 89, 25-90:12). GRCC then cites exhibit 40, 
and R. V 1, p. 60:11 -61:8 for the proposition that "Thayn refused to negotiate a new 
agreement or to cease diversions in violation of the 1952 agreements". In fact, what 
those references disclose is "We had many meetings. The problem wasn't completely 
ironed out. We worked at it. Some generators were shut off and we got a band-aid..." 
(R. V. 1, p. 60:24-61). That witness then acknowledged it was "OK". (Id, at 61:5>. 
Exhibit 40, GRCC' s own minutes show: "Thayns will shut 1 turbine down on 6/25/92 
@ 1:00. Will measure ditch before and after to see what difference it makes. In the 
mean time, will resolve who owns raceway and dam. Will also look at maintenance 
on dam." (Ex. 40, minutes of June 24, 1992).11 In other words, even as late as June 
of 1992, GRCC had still not disclosed the 1952 amendment, nor were its own 
members aware of it! If the 1952 amendment were such critical rights, why was that 
nOf course, in direct contravention to U. C. A. § 73-5-4 which mandates every user to 
have measuring devises, GRCC has not, even to this day, complied. It had no idea whether it got 
its flow or not. When GRCC did have measurement taken, those measurements showed a flow 
far in excess of its state allotted maximum water flow. (R. 1901, p. 21: 14-25; p. 73, 4-5; 138, 5-
17). (Depending on witness measurements were 69.2 cfs, or 78.4 -82.7 cfs; state allowed 
maximum cfs for GRCC is 60 cfs). All of the actual measurements done show GRCC to be 
exceeding its water rights. 
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not then being pointed out to Thayns? 
To resolve any problems, Thayn offered to clean the raceway, even at his own 
expense. (R. 256-259). The raceway needed cleaning well prior to Thayn's building 
of the power facilities, as it had last been cleaned in the 1970fs. (R. 1903, p. 28-29). 
Evidence at trial was that GRCC has additional problems in its own gravity canal 
causing loss of head pressure. The "inverted siphon" is backing flow up the canal 
reducing the flow through the canal. (R. 1902, V. 9, p. 75:14-19)12 and that GRCCs 
gravity canal needs vegetation removed. (R. 1902, V.9, p. 71-73). On March 14, 
1989, Thayns offered to pay GRCC "as previously agreed" (under the National Hydro 
agreement). GRCC minutes show that three year later they had not even bothered to 
review the agreement.13 
15. In [^35 of its statement of facts, GRCC asserts "Thayn has realized economic gain 
from the commercial sale of electrical power.... but refused to compensate GRCC for 
the additional and unauthorized use of GRCCs diversion works...", citing to an 
affidavit submitted in opposition to summary judgment.14 That affidavit does not 
establish any gain to Thayn, it merely establishes he was selling electricity. Whether 
at a loss or a profit was never elucidated at trial. Moreover, that affidavit refers to an 
^Measurements on April 21, 1999 showed over 100 cfs in GRCCs gravity canal (R. 
1902, V.9, p. 74). 
13See GRCC,minutes, excerpts attached as addendum 11. 
14This affidavit was not offered into evidence at trial on the trespass and lost profits 
issues. 
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absence of any billing by GRCC for maintenance work on the facilities. It does not 
support the proposition that Thayn refused to compensate GRCC for the use of their 
facilities, but that GRCC had never billed for maintenance, likely because non had 
been done. 
16. While GRCC has stated it protested "applications", in fact GRCC protested only the 
National Hydro application for 1400 cfs. - one, not plural, application. 
(b) Additional facts in response to GRCC's cross appeal, 
17. In N. 21 on page 26 of its brief, GRCC alleges the public policy issue cited by Thayn 
was never raised below. This is error. For example, Thayn's counsel argued that to 
the court even as late as trial. (R. 1902, V. 5, p. 80). 
18. GRCC states on page 38, N. 37 of its brief that Thayn denied building a commercial 
power plant. No citation to the record is made. As noted herein, GRCC and the 
community at large were aware of the project. In fact, tours were being done 
throughout the plant. (R. 1901, V. 3, pp. 7-9). Moreover, an environmental impact 
statement was done as a part of the FERC exemption permit. Therein, Ron Hagen, 
employee of Soil Conservation Service and shareholder in GRCC stated in his report 
of October, 1990 "The Green River Canal Company and local farmers and area 
residents are in favor of the project. Not aware of anyone opposed to this project". 
(Ex. 49, p. 3). 
19. In addition to the facts cited by GRCC regarding the radial sluice gates, the court did 
an on site visit. Pictures of what could be seen were also admitted into evidence. 
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Exhibit 42, pp. 1,2,4, & 7 also show that the radial sluice gates are a continuous part 
of the pump house structure. (Addm. 3). Exhibit 102 shows that the north wing wall 
of the radial gate structure and the new concrete walkway. (Addm. 5). Exhibit 5 
shows the work in progress in renovating that building. (Addm. 7). Exhibit 77 
showed the work involved in renovating the used turbines and generators for 
installation into the facility. (Addm. 9). 
20. Exhibits 32 and 33 show the overgrown vegetation and condition of the raceway 
throughout this litigation. (Addm. 8). 
ARGUMENT - REPLY 
POINT 1. (a) Thayn did not admit GRCC's "right" to 80 cfs and reserved his right to 
appeal. 
GRCC cites two grounds for its allegation that Thayn admitted a prior water right of 80 cfs. 
First, GRCC argues here, as it did below, that f 12 of the Answer to GRCC's Second Supplemental 
Complaint is somehow a conclusive admission. A history of the pleading is apropos. GRCC's 
original complaint sets forth verbatim the language in f6 of the 1952 agreement and the language 
of Tfl of the 1952 amendment. (R. 3 f^lO). Thayn's answer admits the wording of the two 
agreements, but specifically states: 
Thayn specifically denies the allegation that those provisions "limit 
the use that Thayn may make of the water diversion structure and 
water diversion facilities".The provisions at issue do nothing more 
than establish priority in which Green River and Thayn's predecessor 
could use the facilities to transport their existing water rights. The 
provisions do not purport to allocate all of the capacity of the 
facilities, nor do the provisions address the question of how the 
facilities could be used to transport after acquired water rights. 
Nothing in the agreement or amendment limits Thayn's right to 
Page -9-
transport additional water, so long as Green River's priority right to 
satisfy the needs of its shareholders is not impaired. (R. 24-25, ]f 10). 
[emphasis added] 
Thayn, in essence, admitted GRCC's water right had priority over Thayn, but denied such 
language in the agreements limited Thayn's after acquired rights and further that GRCC's prior right 
was limited to GRCC's shareholder's "needs". This is the exact same argument made at the 
Summary Judgment hearing, (R. 1905, pp.9-16). This same argument was made on appeal in 
Thayn's brief, (Applt.'s Brief, pp. 21-38)15. The court below denied Thayn's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, but granted partial summary judgment to GRCC on the contract interpretation issues. 
Thereafter, in June 1997, GRCC filed its second supplemental complaint. (R. 263-312). [^41 
of the second supplemental complaint alleges GRCC's right (to 80 cfs) is prior in time and right to 
Thayn's junior rights. (R. 271). That was admitted. However, j^48 of GRCC's second complaint 
alleges that GRCC is entitled to declaratory judgment that Green River is entitled to 80 cfs of water 
and that Thayn's water rights are junior to GRCCs (R. 272). That paragraph was specifically denied. 
(R.258). Moreover, GRCC plead exactly the same provisions it had in its original complaint, ^[1-
20, to which Thayn incorporated its original answers thereto. (R. 256).16 What Thayn was admitting 
15
 GRCC's allegation that Thayn is raising new issues on appeal in this regard is false. 
16
 Attached to the second supplemental complaint was a copy of GRCC's statement of 
water users claim as Exhibit H. (R. 293-298); that copy , however, does not have the notation on 
it that GRCC's 60 cfs irrigation right is inclusive of its 20 cfs water right. However, in 
opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Thayn's counsel noted the confusion of 
whether GRCC's right was 60 or 80 cfs. (R. 457). Thereafter, Thayn's counsel apparently 
received the correct copy of GRCC's proposed determination which noted the water right was 
60 cfs inclusive of the 20 stock watering and domestic right, and filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Partial Summary Judgment (R. 571-593). This was denied by the trial 
court stating the motion had no new material facts or legal theories not considered by the court. 
(R. 873-874). Even though GRCC claims, on page 20 of their brief, that its water rights are 
unadjudicated and non-binding, such is not the law, U.C.A. § 73-4-11, and the state has denied 
any attempt to change their right (Addm 10). 
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was again the priority, not the quantity. 
Second, GRCC cites to Mr. Martineau's statement in open court as an admission. The trial 
court had twice ruled on summary judgment motions that GRCC had an 80 cfs prior water right, (R. 
314-318; 497-498) and denied Thayn's motion for reconsideration. (R. 873-874). At trial, Thayn 
attempted to elucidate evidence of GRCC s failure to maintain the raceway, the diversion dam and 
their own ditch as a part of their affirmative defenses raised in the pleadings. Mr. Martineau did 
refer to the 80 cfs as being "stipulated to", but a fair reading of the whole exchange between the 
court and counsel, (R. 78-83) reveals what Mr. Martineau meant was "ruled upon". Even Mr. Smith 
understood this at the time. His response argument to the Court was "Thayn's claiming we don't 
have a right to 80 cfs". (R. 1902, VI. pp. 81-82). The court held it was "ruled upon" not stipulated 
to. (R. 1902, V. l ,p. 86). As was stated by Thayn's counsel "We recognize, your Honor, that 80 
cfs is the amount specified in the order. We'll stipulate to that." (R.1901,p. 74). 
In any event, this appeal inter alia, is upon the issue of the court's ruling on summary 
judgment, and the propriety of entering that summary judgment order. Martineau's statement some 
three years after those rulings bears no effect and can hardly be considered an abandonment of 
Thayn's appeal rights. This is especially true, where Defendant had repeatedly opposed entry of 
partial summary judgment in the first place and moved for reconsideration of the trial court's ruling 
on the very issue of the 60 versus 80 cfs water right claimed by GRCC. 
Even if the court were to construe the foregoing statements as a conclusive admission, this 
would allow parties to a lawsuit to obviate the water right limitations statutes by means of collusive 
suits over individual contract issues. It is anticipated that GRCC may respond, that this action is 
certainly not collusive and Judge Bryner's ruling would not be binding on the state engineer. If so, 
then the ruling of the trial court limits Thayn to 435 cfs for no reason whatsoever. No useful 
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purpose is served either party by the limitation imposed. Thayn can't generate hydro power; GRCC 
is still limited to 60 cfs. Was that the parties original intent? 
The trial court, rather than looking at course of dealing, custom and even the interpretation 
the parties themselves placed upon the 1952 amendment by their conduct,17 applied a "four corners" 
test and, Thayn believes, ignored the heart and principle of the contract. The true test of the contract 
was need, not want, desire or reckless disregard for waste, but need. Need, Thayn believes, is 
defined by the state approved rights, subject to limitation as to both acre feet and duty, preserving 
for the benefit of the citizens of this state all water not lawfully appropriated through the water law 
statutory process. 
(b) (1) In court admissions cannot affect water rights not approved by the 
engineer's office or obtained in the general adjudication. 
Even if Thayn's counsel's slip of the tongue were construed as an admission, nevertheless 
the trial court could not bestow upon GRCC a water right greater than that approved by the state 
engineer's office or approved in the general adjudication without joining the state engineer. 
U.C. A. § 73-3- 14(a). GRCC now seems to be arguing that its right to 80 cfs arises not by following 
the water law statutes, or by participation in the general Green River adjudication, but under the 
1952 amendment. If this is so, why did GRCC not appeal the determination of the state engineer's 
office that the 20 cfs stock watering and domestic rights are included in its 60 cfs irrigation right? 
17
 GRCC states that the state engineer unilaterally added the footnote making the 20 cfs 
stock watering and domestic part of the 60 cfs general irrigation right of GRCC. That 
conclusion is a mere assertion without factual basis in the record. It is the state engineer's duty 
to review and make beneficial use determinations. U.C.A. §73-4-11. GRCC did not protest the 
engineer's determination as provided for in U.C.A. §73-4-11. Ironically, GRCC then states only 
courts may adjudicate water rights, citing In re General Determination, Murdoch v Springville 
Municipal Court, 982 P.2d 65 (Utah 1999). However, those are proceedings to which the state 
engineer is a party, not ones, as the present case where the state engineer's voice is left out. 
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(R. 1369). The answer is GRCC knows that use, need and necessity govern the allocation of scarce 
public resources. 
GRCC knows one cannot obtain by private contract any right greater than that to which it 
is entitled by state water law. GRCC cites S & G, Inc. v Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990) for 
the proposition that a breach of contract issue is not within the purview of the state engineers office. 
This is true. But at the time GRCC was filing its statement of water user's intent, there was no issue 
of breach. If GRCC felt it had need for more than 60 cfs, it has had well over 20 years to raise that 
issue. 
Rather, GRCC placed upon the 1952 amendment the exact same interpretation that Thayn 
has argued in this appeal and as argued before. GRCC did not, at the time of its water filings, 
believe the 1952 amendment elevated it to a higher water right. It understood the language used 
therein was merely descriptive of the rights the parties believed they had, at the time, and such 
language was not used by way of permanent limitation. 
(b) (2) "Duty" and "Need" 
GRCC passes over, for the most part, the issue of duty and need. GRCC acknowledges in 
its brief that all water rights are subject to duty limitations. The duty limitations, of which the trial 
court declined to hear evidence inasmuch as it said it was only ruling on contract issues, is the 
essential argument as to the "need" required by the 1952 amendment. Neither party under the 1952 
amendment can need any more water than that to which they are lawfully entitled to use under their 
water right as allowed by Utah water law. The contract cannot bestow a greater water right than that 
18Footnote 26 of GRCC's brief asserts "unprecedented water shortages" alleging it was 
due to Thayn's plant. Ted Ekker, board member prior to 1992 and president in 1992 stated they 
had water shortages in the 1950fs and described Thayn's use as a "bump". (R. 1895, pp. 175-
176). 
Page-13-
to which the State of Utah has allocated a party. If it could, the prohibitions of U. C. A. § 73-3-1 
would be meaningless. Accordingly, the parties existing water rights are the absolute definition of 
need under the contract. GRCC was unable to face this issue directly in its responsive brief, and, 
accordingly, elected to slight over it. However, the trial court's refusal to consider the parties 
existing water rights as the definition of need renders that word meaningless in the 1952 amendment. 
Accordingly, as a matter of law the trial court misconstrued the contract and reversal of the summary 
judgment ruling is mandated. 
Moreover, GRCC has no basis for claiming a need for 80 cfs until it has an approved water 
right for 80 cfs, which is has never obtained or even applied for. On the other hand, an approved 
water right to Thayn for 600 cfs year round demonstrates Thayn's "need" under the contract because 
it has both an approved water right for such quantity of use and the facility built by which to use it. 
The trial court simply ignored the "need" language of the contract in direct opposition to the 
principle elucidated in Dixon v Pro Image, Inc.,9%1 P.2d 48 (Utah 1999) (Court must construe a 
contract so as to harmonize and give effect to all of its provisions). Under the construction of the 
19U.C. A. §73-3-1 provides: 
Rights to the use of the unappropriated public water in this state 
may be acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of 
water may be made and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no 
notice of intent to appropriate shall be recognized except 
application for such appropriation first be made the state engineer 
in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The 
appropriation must be for some useful and beneficial purpose, and, 
as between appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in 
rights; provided, that when a use designated by an application to 
appropriate any of the unappropriated water of the state would 
materially interfere with a more beneficial use of such water, the 
application shall be dealt with as provided in Section 73-38. No 
right to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can 
be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession, [emphasis 
added] 
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contract as elucidated by Judge Bryner, what role does "need" play? 
(c) The trial court failed to look at the parties course of conduct in construing the 
agreements. 
Appellee, GRCC, asserts that Thayn was arguing in its original brief that the court should 
look to "other agreements" after the 1952 agreement and that such issue was not raised below. 
Thayn did not argue in his original brief there were other agreements (beyond the National Hydro 
contract). Rather, Thayn argued at the original summary judgment hearing on October 15, 1996: 
In our view, your honor, there is simply no basis for seeking, at this 
point, to challenge a situation that has persisted, in fact, for 40 some 
odd years. In our view the contract does not address the issue of who 
gets the capacity of these facilities over and above the 515 cfs. (R. 
1905 p.13). 
Thayn's counsel went on to state: 
A second and related point is that in our view the parties have simply 
construed the contract one way for 40 some odd years and under the 
rule of practical construction the interpretation the parties have given 
a contract over a long period of time is viewed as the best evidence 
of what the parties mean. (R. 1905, p.15). 
That, is a course of dealing argument made by Thayn's counsel at the very inception of this 
case. 
GRCC has created nothing more than a red herring, misconstruing Thayn's argument 
to this Court and then outrageously arguing the issue was not raised below.20 As argued in his prior 
brief, Thayn maintains that the trial court failed to do the proper contract interpretation analysis in 
trying to ascertain the parties intent. It is wholly illogical that Wilson was intending by the 1952 
GRCC argues it should be awarded attorney fees under U. R. A. P. Rule 33. In view of 
the number of red herrings made by GRCC, the pot is indeed calling the kettle black, and it is 
Thayn who should be awarded his fees for having to respond to "non-issues" created in the mind 
of GRCC s counsel only. 
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amendment to preclude himself or his successors from hydroelectric power.21 Wilson was utilizing 
water turbines for mechanical based water pumping. (Ex. 54, Ex. 25-26). It is equally as illogical 
that GRCC was intending to violate the law and derive by contract a water right greater than its 
shareholders could legally use. Yet, the trial courts interpretation necessitates both of the foregoing 
axioms were within the parties intent at the time of contracting in 1952, if we accept the summary 
judgment rulings as valid. In Hodges Irr. Co. v. Swan Creels Canal Co., 111 Utah 405 (1947) this 
Court held that a practical construction of the terms of the contract as applied by the parties thereto 
was appropriate and entitled to greater weight. 
POINT 2. (a) GRCC was under a duty to record the 1952 amendment. 
GRCC argues that it can bind subsequent purchasers, such as Thayn, to the 1952 amendment 
despite their failure to record. The 1952 agreement was recorded, so the issue as to that in 
irrelevant. In fact, therein lies the rub. Because the 1952 agreement was recorded, and because 
Thayn had notice of the 1952 agreement, he believed he had an operable contract in place which 
contained the following language: 
It is understood and agreed that before the party of the second part 
can or may use any water from said dam, diverting works or space 
way that the first party shall have enough and sufficient water to 
supply its stockholders. The quantity of water to supply the 
stockholders of the first party is to be exclusively determined by the 
first party. 
Thus, Thayn was under no notice that the GRCC party was claiming an 80 cfs priority. The 
language, "exclusively determined by the first party", would, of necessity, be reasonably 
determined. The first party could not claim 10,000 cfs and deprive the second party of all water 
2
 In note 27 GRCC cites alleged facts appearing nowhere in the record. Apparently, 
GRCC feels it is appropriate to just make them up as it goes along. 
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without any basis in law or fact to utilize same. The same is true for claiming 80 cfs, when GRCC's 
state right is 60 cfs, inclusive of its 20 cfs stock watering. This Court has long held that parties to 
a contract owe duties of good faith and the construction of one-sided language has always been so 
construed. Brown v Moore, 973 P.2d 950 (Utah 1998) (The Supreme Court is not limited to the 
express contractual provisions in determining whether a party has breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing; Court will also consider the course of dealing). 
If Thayn had no contract of record between GRCC and Wilson, perhaps the lower court's 
ruling that the duty was on Thayn to further investigate would be appropriate. But where a contract 
is presented, how, if not recorded, would one ever know there was an amendment thereto? U. C. 
A. § 73-1-10 specifically states that water rights are to be transferred by deed in the same manner 
as real estate and shall be recorded in the county office. Such filing at the county level is notice 
to all. Filing with the state engineer's office serves as notice to the world likewise. (See, U.C.A. 
§ 73-3-18). But it is not just a failure to record of which Thayn complains. Even as late as the 
negotiation of the National Hydro agreement, the county records showed nothing more than the 
1952 agreement without the 1952 amendment. In other words, what is recorded in the county 
records is a half truth. This 1952 agreement was set forth in an attachment to the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) application. (Ex. 54). GRCC was party to that contract negotiated 
with National Hydro and Thayns and still, as of 1983, had not revealed the secretly held 1952 
amendment of which GRCC had full knowledge. 
As a matter of policy, this Court must ask itself how to prevent similar suits in the future. 
Shifting the burden to purchasers to somehow discover secret, unrecorded, and undisclosed 
contractual agreements (or amendments thereto) will undoubtedly lead to a plethora of future 
litigations. On the other hand, imposing the burden upon the contract holder to record, disclose, or 
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otherwise protest when adverse water rights are filed by a party, will minimize future litigation. 
This is the rationale of the statutes already passed by Utah's legislature. This should be the rationale 
of this Court. The conclusion of law made by the trial court that the burden was upon Thayn to 
discover, instead of that the burden was upon GRCC to record and disclose, was error as a matter 
of law and is bad policy for the State of Utah and should be reversed. 
Finally, on this point, GRCC argues that the 1952 amendment is not extrinsic evidence. If 
it was not utilized by the trial court to interpret the original 1952 agreement, but, as GRCC asserts, 
is a part and parcel of the original agreement, what has been recorded in the county records by 
recording of the 1952 agreement is a falsity. It is a false and misleading notice. It doesn't contain 
all the material terms. It does not put subsequent purchasers on notice of the true state of affairs. 
This would be tantamount to allowing someone to record half a contract or "a notice of contract" 
but never recording the actual contract. Imagine if you will, because of the length, a prospective 
purchaser ran across a notice of contract in the county records. Upon inquiry to the canal company, 
an obsolete copy of the contract was sent (even in innocent error) to the purchaser. In reliance 
thereon the purchaser procures the property, only to have the updated version of the contract later 
asserted against him to his prejudice. Here, the situation is actually worse, because what purports 
to be the complete contract is recorded. In fact, it is not the complete contract, as so any purchaser 
would not have notice whatsoever of a duty of further inquiry. As a matter of good court policy, for 
the reduction of future problems and for the elimination of these kinds of errors, this Court should 
hold that the duty is upon the canal company to record all of its agreements, and not merely "half 
truths". 
POINT 3. (A) The trial court erred in not granting Thayn leave to amend his counterclaim 
and assert eminent domain. 
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GRCC argued vehemently below, but apparently abandons that claim on appeal, that what 
was at issue was private property rights. (R. 1905, pp. 19-20).22 
Unable to cite even a scintilla of evidence for their proposition, other than a jury instruction 
having nothing to do with water rights, (GRCC's brief, p. 27, |24), GRCC now reiterates nothing 
more than the same old cases dealing with the division of maintenance responsibilities where parties 
had contracted a formula for assessment thereof.23 As noted in the original brief of Thayn, those 
cases are not precedent as to new or expanded uses not in existence at the time of the contract. 
Appellant stands on the reasoning cited in his opening brief. 
POINT 4. GRCC was not properly awarded attorney's fees where the conduct sought to 
be enjoined of was illegal. 
During the course of the litigation GRCC built a 40 foot wall in the raceway to impede water 
to Thayn's pump house under the guise of increasing water to GRCC's ditch.24 (R. 1895, p. 166; 
Addm. 1 shows location of rebar where wall was built). The trial court ultimately ruled there was 
GRCC contends in footnote 21 that the public policy issue was not raised below; 
actually Plaintiff raised and argued that public policy was against the statutory right of eminent 
domain. (R. 1905, p. 25). Moreover, as noted in Thayn's first brief, the trial court said it was 
only ruling on the contract, then in the end what the court did was adjudicate water rights. (R. 
1646). Thayn also argued public policy at trial. (R. 1902, V. 5, p. 80). 
23
 Ironically, GRCC now argues U. C. A. § 73-1-6 was not raised below. (GRCC's brief. 
27, N. 23). Thayn's counsel sought leave to file a counterclaim which sought the right to clean 
and enlarge the raceway. While not citing 73-1-6, this is the clear intent and objective of the 
counterclaim, which motion was denied by Judge Brynner without explanation as to why that 
portion of the counterclaim was not applicable. Thus, GRCC contends that Thayn has no rights 
under the contract and none by statute either. 
24
 No evidence was ever submitted at trial that the wall had any effect of increasing the 
water flow in the ditch. With no modifications to the ditch itself there was no evidence that the 
wall did anything but impede the water flow to Thayn. Moreover, the trial court ultimately 
found the place where the wall was built was Thayn's property (R. 1705). Accordingly, GRCC 
was also trespassing at the time. 
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no underlying cause of action and therefore dissolved the temporary restraining order. (R. 625-626). 
However, Thayn had previously applied to amend his complaint to raise a counter claim for both 
maintenance of the raceway issues and for eminent domain under U. C. A. § 73-1-6. (R. 148-150). 
The trial court ruled that the eminent domain statute did not apply and thereby denied Thayn's right 
to file the counter claim. No reason was given by the trial court for denial of allowance of the 
maintenance issues (R. 242-243). The trial court further denied Thayn's attempt to raise the 
maintenance issues at trial. (R. 1902, V. 1, pp. 82-86). The sole reason Thayn had no underlying 
cause of action in the pleadings upon which to premise a preliminary injunction, was because Thayn 
had been precluded from raising maintenance issues of the raceway throughout the litigation. The 
net effect of Judge Bryner's rulings was to preclude Thayn from himself having any rights under 
the 1952 agreement (and amendment) while granting all rights asked for by GRCC under the 
contract. 
Moreover, the conduct complained of and sought to be enjoined is strictly illegal under Utah 
law. U. C. A. § 73-1-15 provides in relevant part: 
Whenever any person, partnership, company or corporation has a 
right-of-way of any established type or title for any canal or water 
course it shall be unlawful for any person, persons, or governmental 
agencies to place or maintain in place any obstruction, or change in 
the water flow by fence or otherwise, along or across in such canal or 
water course, except as where said water course inflicts damage to 
private property, without first receiving written permission for the 
change and providing gates sufficient for the passage of the owner or 
owners of such canal or water course. That the vested rights in the 
established canals and water course shall be protected against all 
encroachments... Any person, partnership, company or corporation 
violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and 
is subject to damages and costs. 
Similarly, U. C. A. § 73-1-14 provides: 
Interfering with water works or with a portioning official -
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penalty and liability 
Any person, who in any way unlawfully interferes with, injures, 
destroys or removes any dam, head gate, weir, casing, valve, cap or 
other appliance for the diversion, apportionment, measurement or 
regulation of water, or who interferes with any person authorized to 
apportion water while in the discharge of his duties, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and is also liable in damages to any person injured by 
such unlawful act. 
In this case, the conduct of GRCC which Thayn sought to be enjoined of is illegal.25 Thayn 
sought nothing from the trial court but to uphold the law. Instead, GRCC was awarded attorney's 
fees for its intentional participation in an illegal act.26 GRCC established no damages for the 
restraint against the 40 foot wall and could not because such was an illegal act. In fact, to this 
counsel's belief, counseling or assisting your client in committing an illegal act (not challenged as 
to the constitutionality of the law), is inappropriate and unethical. To award attorney's fees to a 
party committing an illegal act is to turn the law on its head. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be liberal construed to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action". U. R. C. P. 1(a). In the present action, the Rules of 
Civil Procedure were strictly construed against Thayn and in favor of GRCC. Virtually every 
motion filed by GRCC was granted by the trial court, but not so as to Defendant Thayn. While each 
individual decision may fall within the discretion of the trial court rule, when viewed as a whole, 
it is hard to comprehend that justice was done here. Form over substance is the hallmark of the trial 
courts rulings below in this case and is not consistent with the overall purpose of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. It is not coincidental that the canal company chose a date after the cut off deadline for 
25The court found that the proposed wall would reduce the efficiency and out put of the 
water turbines, resulting in insufficient power to pump water into Thayn's irrigation canal as 
well as generate electricity. (R. 624). 
26
 The 40 foot wall was ultimately ordered removed by Federal officials. 
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amendment of pleadings, and after the trial court had already denied Thayn's attempt to amend his 
pleadings, as its time to construct the 40 foot wall. Awarding attorney's fees for participating in the 
commission of an illegal act is so appalling as to demand the court reverse the order on public policy 
grounds alone. Justice is supposed to be blind, not stupid. The award of attorney's fees below 
should be reversed. 
POINT 5. (a) The proper burden of proof for estoppel is the preponderance of the 
evidence standard. 
GRCC cites, in support of its argument for application of the clear and convincing evidence 
standard, footnote 6 of Soter's Inc. v Desert Federal Saving & Loan Ass 'n, 857 P.2d 935,942 (Utah 
1993). An in depth review of the cases cited by GRCC reveals that a number of those cases do not 
actually support the principle cited, or the Courts have used the term "equitable 
estoppel" interchangeably with "fraud".27 Few, if any of the cited cases have analyzed the propriety 
27
 DoddvDodd, 181 Ariz. 183, 888 P.2d 1370 (Ariz. App Div.l, 1994) (holding latches, 
not estoppel, requires clear and convincing evidence in child support cases). Arkansas National 
Bank v Boles, 133 S. W. 195 (Ark. 1910) (estoppel must be strictly proved; This equity 
[estoppel] being merely an instance of fraud, requires intentional deceit.; International Text Book 
Co., v Pratt Mercantile & Pub. Co., 158 P.2d 712 (Colo. 1916) (It was a jury question as to what 
inferences were to be drawn from the evidence; rights are not be diverted by means of estoppel 
unless clearly and fully established); Reader v Sanford School Inc., 397 A.2d 139 (Del. 
super. 1979) (holding promissory estoppel requires clear and convincing evidence); Cochlo v 
Fernandez, 384 P.2d 527, 530 (Hawaii 1963) (stating that the estoppel claim was in fact a 
specific performance claim, for which the burden is clear, definite and unequivocal evidence; the 
court does not apply this to all estoppel claims nor did it overrule, or even cite, Gushiken v Shell 
Oil Co., 354 Hawaii 420, which specifically held the standard of proof for estoppel is 
preponderance of the evidence). D. G. v D. M. K.. 557 N. W. 2d 235 (S. D. 1996) (requires the 
presence of fraud, false representation or concealment to apply equitable estoppel in child 
support cases); Fisher v West Virginia Coal and Transport Co., 73 S. E. 2d 633 (W. V. 1952) 
(To preclude a landowner from legal title on the basis of estoppel, actual fraud or fault or 
negligence equivalent to fraud on his part must be shown). Two cases, Central Fed. Sav. FSB v 
Laurels Sullivan Country Estates Corp. 145 A.2d (N.Y.A.D. 1989) and St. Paul Ramsey Med. 
Center v Wisconsin Dept. of Health, 519 N. W. 2d (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) are bad citations and the 
cases not found. 
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of applying such a heightened standard. 
In researching this matter, counsel discovered that the real origin of the "clear and 
convincing evidence" rule, insofar as estoppel goes, is an ALR Digest, 4 ALR 3d 361. That digest, 
in fact, categorized cases into courts applying a "clear" evidence standard, a "clear and satisfactory" 
standard, a "clear and convincing" and the "preponderance of the evidence" burdens on the estoppel 
claimants. 
As noted previously, many courts, especially the older cases, interchangeably utilized the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel with fraud, and of course the clear and convincing evidence standard 
would then apply. 
The courts applying the "clear" and "clear and satisfactory" standards really were not 
elucidating whether they in fact were imposing a higher quantum of proof, or were merely criticizing 
the nature of the proof in the particular circumstances. This is significantly apparent in those 
jurisdictions where no definitive statement of the elements of estoppel had been elucidated. 
Then there are courts specifying that estoppel requires only the ordinary burden of proof 
standard. DeYoung v Del Mar Thoroughbred Club, 159 Cal. App 3d 858, 206 Cal, Rpt. 28 (Cal. 
App.4th 1985);Drake vEggleston, 123 Ind. App. 306,108 N. E. 2d67(1952); Junker v Crory, 650 
F.2d 1349 (A. 5th 1981) (applying Louisiana law); Chapman v Chapman, 473 S. 2d 467 (Miss. 
1985); Joseph R. Awad & Co. v Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 193 NYS 2d 306 (App. Div. 9, 1959); N. Y. 
Cent. RR Co. v General Motors Corp., 182 F. Supp 273 (D. C. Ohio, 1960) (applying Ohio law); 
Webb v Board of Trustees, 271 S. W. 2d 6 (Tenn. 1954); FordvCulbertson, 308 S. W. 2d 855 (Tex. 
1958); Re: Walkins Est, 30 A.2d 305 (Vt. 1943) cert den. 319 U. S. 757, 63 S. Ct. 1177. 
The better reasoned cases is that the three doctrines, waiver estoppel and latches should all 
be governed by the same preponderance of the evidence standard. See, Maletis, Inc. v Schmitt 
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Forge, Inc., 127 Or. App 37, 870 P.2d 865 (Or. App. 1994) Rev. den. 330 Or. 110 (1994). 
The courts have long applied a higher burden upon a party alleging fraud; however, no 
rationale has been provided as to why such higher burden is applicable in estoppel cases. As noted 
mKilduffvAdams, Inc. 593 A.2d478 (Conn. 1991) inN.14: 
The following reason are commonly cited as justification for 
requiring a more exacting burden of proof in fraud actions: (1) fraud 
usually must be proven through the use of circumstantial evidence so 
that a heightened standard is imposed to reflect the latitude allowed 
in admitting evidence of fraud; Disner v Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation, 726 F.2d 1106, 1110 (6th Cir. 1984); Smith v Rhode 
Island Co., 39 R. O. 146, 154, 98 A. 1 (1916); 37 Am. Jur.2d, Fraud 
and Deceit § 468, p. 646; 37 C. J. S„ Fraud § 114, p. 431; (2) 
evidence of fraud must be sufficient to overcome the presumption 
that people are innocent of moral turpitude or crime; Verrastro v. 
Middlesen Ins. Co., 207 Conn. 179, 183, 540 A.2d 693 (1988); 
Apolito v Johnson, 3 Ariz. App. 232,236,413 P.2d 291, modified on 
other grounds, 3 Ariz. App. 358, 414 P.2d 442 (1966); 37 C. J. S., 
Fraud § 114, p. 430; (3) in equity cases, a higher burden of proof is 
imposed to justify the availability of broader remedies than those 
available in an action at law for damages. Batka v. Liberty Mutual 
Fire Ins. Co., 704 F.2d 684,688 (3d Cir. 1983) (applying New Jersey 
law); C. McCormick, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 340; and (4) a person 
found guilty of fraudulent conduct suffers a "stigma of guilt" 
regardless of whether the underlying action was civil or criminal. 
Riley Hill General Contractor, Inc., v Tandy Corporation, 303 Or. 
390, 407, 737 P.2d 595 (1987). 
A review of the case law on the development of the burden of 
proof in fraud actions sheds no light on which, if any, of these factors 
were determinative in this court's adoption of the "clear, precise and 
unequivocal" standard. In BasakvDamutz, 105 Conn. 378, 382-83, 
135 A. 453 (1926), we applied the "clear, precise and unequivocal" 
standard to the plaintiffs claim that the defendant was equitably 
estopped from denying ownership of certain land on the ground that 
the defendant was party to a fraudulent conveyance. That standard 
was applied for the first time to an action at law for damages 
resulting from fraud in Shaub v. Phillips, Inc., 117 Conn. 54, 58,166 
A. 671 (1933), citing BasakvDamutz, supra, 105 Conn, at 382, 135 
A. 453. Shaub implicitly overruled prior case law in which we had 
indicated that fraud need be proven only by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Daly Bros., Inc. v. Spallone, 114 Conn. 236, 240-43, 158 
A. 237 (1932); see Bennett v. Gibbons, 55 Conn. 450, 454, 12 A. 99 
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(1887); cf. Water Commissioners v Robbins, 82 Conn. 623, 640, 14 
A. 938 (1910) (fraud must be proven by "clear, strong, natural, and 
logical" evidence, but the fact that fraud is not to be presumed does 
not add to the plaintiffs burden of proof). The Shaub court, 
however, gave no explanation of why it was imposing the higher 
standard. Shaub v Phillips, Inc., supra. 
It does not appear that any of the four reasons noted above provide 
a clear explanation for our imposition of a higher burden of proof. 
We had recognized the latitude allowed in the admission of evidence 
of fraudulent conduct long before we imposed a higher burden of 
proof in fraud actions. See, e.g., Robert v. Finberg, 85 Conn. 557, 
562, 84 A. 366 (1912); Hozie v Home Ins. Co., 32 Conn. 21, 37 
(1864). Similarly, our recognition of the role played by 
circumstantial evidence in proving fraud predates our decision in 
Shaub v. Phillips, Inc., supra. See e.g., Sallies v. Johnson, 85 Conn. 
77, 80-81,81 A. 974(1911). 
We have also rejected the suggestion that proof of criminal activity 
in a civil action requires a more stringent quantum of proof. 
Verrastro v. Middlesex Ins. Co., supra 207 Conn, at 183, 540 A.2d 
693, citing Mead v Husted, 52 Conn. 53 (1884), and Munson v. 
Atwood, 30 Conn. 102 (1861). Similarly, we have stated that the fact 
that fraud is not to be presumed does not serve to increase the burden 
of proof otherwise applicable to a plaintiff in a fraud action O'Dea 
v Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 60, 170 A. 486 (1934); Water 
Commissioners v Robbins, supra. Moreover, this rule was part of our 
law while the preponderance of the evidence standard was still the 
burden of proof in fraud actions. See Morford v. Peck, 46 Conn. 380, 
384-85 (1878); Huntington v. Clark, 39 Conn. 540, 557 (1873). 
The third rationale for imposing a higher burden of proof for fraud 
was clearly not relevant in the development of our case law. Ever 
since the "clear, precise and unequivocal standard" was first applied 
to an action at law for fraud in Shaub v Phillips, Inc., supra, we have 
required a higher burden in legal as well as equitable actions. See, 
e.g., Miller v Appleby, 183 Conn. 51, 55, 438, A.2d 811 (1981); 
DeLuca v. C W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 174 Conn. 535, 546, 391 
A.2d 179 (1978); Creelman v Rogowski, 152 Conn. 382, 284, 207 
A.2d 272 (1965). Finally, although we have never discussed the 
stigma attached to allegations of fraud, it is not clear whether this 
rationale is distinct from the previously noted presumption that one 
is innocent of criminal or morally base acts. 
Although the rationale for our imposition of a higher burden of proof 
for fraud claims is shrouded in the mist of the common law, we do 
not find it necessary in deciding this case to articulate our rationale 
for continuing to apply an elevated standard or to address whether we 
should abandon that standard, [emphasis added] 
Page -25-
As well articulated by the Kildof 'case, none of the four (4) elements claimed justify a higher 
standard of proof in fraud cases would be applicable to equitable estoppel. First, equitable estoppel 
is not a crime, it does not carry the stigma of moral turpitude that fraud does, and does not carry the 
broader remedies that fraud does. For example, punitive damages aren't being awarded in a 
equitable estoppel case as they are in fraud. If we're going to raise the bar, so to speak, on equitable 
estoppel cases, should not those parties having successfully proved equitable estoppel also receive 
the heightened advantage of punitive damages? Second, the allowance of circumstantial evidence 
is present equally as well in waiver and latches cases, which this Court has already held apply on 
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Soters Inc. v Desert Federal Savings and Loan 
Association, supra. Other types of estoppel cases require only a preponderance of the evidence 
standard even in jurisdictions which apply the clear and convincing rule to equitable estoppel. See 
e.g., Zick v Krob, 872 P.2d 1290 (Colo. App. 1993) (claim for promissory estoppel must be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence). And what of judicial estoppel? Will we have a 
different standard for a judicial estoppel, or promissory estoppel, than equitable estoppel? Finally, 
unlike fraud, equitable estoppel is not a quasi criminal action and the presumption of innocence of 
criminal wrongdoing is inapplicable. 
Application of the clear and convincing rule may be justified when applied to fraud. 
Application to other doctrines, such as equitable estoppel, only serves to confuse the administration 
of the judiciary. Absent compelling reasons, the standard ordinarily applied to all other defenses 
should equally apply to equitable estoppel. There are no compelling circumstances which would 
justify elevating this standard and the Court should hold that the appropriate burden of proof for 
estoppel is the same as it is for latches and for waiver, i.e. preponderance of the evidence presented. 
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Latches, waiver and estoppel are often, if not routinely plead and considered together by the trier 
of fact. To draw a heightened burden of proof for one doctrine, while retaining the standard burden 
for the other two is to draw a distinction so fine as to be incapable of being maintained by the mind 
for conscious through. Such a rule adds nothing but confusion and complexity to the law without 
any incumbent benefits and this Court should reject it outright. 
(b) Evidence supports application of estoppel, waiver and latches to preclude 
GRCC from asserting its rights under the amendment. 
GRCC asserts that Thayn claims estoppel because GRCC did not sue prior to the 
power plant construction. GRCC cites to nowhere in the record for this red herring 
proposition.28 Rather, it is GRCCs failure to protest Wilsons application for 600 cfs, 
Wilson's application for 600 cfs year round non-consumptive use, and to at any time prior 
to building of the power plant disclosing the unrecorded 1952 amendment to Thayn's of 
which Thayn asserts estoppel, waiver and latches. 
Invocation of estoppel does not necessarily involve any contract or agreement and 
consideration is not required to invoke estoppel. Koch v. J, C. Penny, 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 
1975). Intent to mislead is not required for equitable estoppel to preclude landowner from 
asserting his legal title, and mere silence can be sufficient to support application of equitable 
estoppel if landowner's silence in fact misleads other party and landowner was silent when 
he had a duty to speak, Littlefield v Adler, 676 A.2d 940 (Maine 1996). 
Here, Wilson, as Thayn's predecessor, applied first for a 600 cfs power permit, and 
28Nowhere below or in Thayn's appeal brief did he argue anticipatory repudiation. 
Page -27-
then for year round power use of 600 cfs. (Ex. 54, Appd.2). GRCC had a duty to protest said 
permit or water right application. U. C. A. § 73-3-6 provides that upon the application for 
right to use water, the state engineer must publish notice in the newspaper for three 
consecutive weeks, which was done here as to both water application submitted by Thayn's 
predecessor, Wilson (Id.) U.C.A. provides: 
Protests, (1) Any person interested may, at any time within 30 
days after notice is published, file a protest with the state 
engineer. 
(2) The state engineer shall consider the protest and shall 
approve or reject the application. 
GRCC, the one party to this suit who had possession of and full knowledge of the 
unrecorded 1952 amendment, with full knowledge of the facts waived their right to protest 
the Wilson water filings because Wilson was a good old boy. (R. 1903, pp. 13-15). 
Based in part upon the lack of any protest, the state engineer approves the application 
and the water right is perfected under the "Election Process". As noted in U. C. A. § 73-3-
8(1) in relevant part: 
If the state engineer, because of information in his possession 
obtained either by his own investigation or otherwise, has 
reason to believe that an application to appropriate water will 
interfere with its more beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or 
culinary, stock watering, power or mining development or 
manufacturing, or will reasonably affect public recreation or the 
natural stream environment, or will prove detrimental to the 
public welfare, it is his duty to withhold his approval or 
rejection of the application until he has investigated the matter. 
If an application does not meet the requirements of this section, 
it shall be rejected, [emphasis added] 
While it is true the state engineer is not a court, and cannot adjudicate disputed rights, 
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Wardley v Terry, 77. P.2d 362 (Utah 1938), nevertheless had GRCC protested, the state 
engineer would have "withheld approval" thereby alerting Thayn's to the 1952 amendment 
and entirely preventing the present action, and further preventing Thayn's from building a 
power plant and expending some $300,000 on a facility now standing idle. Fault for this 
entire litigation resides with GRCC and GRCC alone for withholding protest, for remaining 
silent until after the plant was built, then ambushing Thayn with the 1952 unrecorded 
amendment. 
Equitable estoppel is invoked to promote justice, honesty and fair dealing, and the 
purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a party from taking unconscionable advantage of his 
wrong while asserting strict legal right. Billings Post No. 1634 v. Montana Dept. of 
Revenue, 943 P.2d 517 (Mont. 1977). 
Here, GRCC did not protest its own allocation of a water right at 60 cfs, inclusive of 
the 20 cfs stock watering right, and subject to duty limitations. GRCC filed a statement of 
water user's claim in 1969, (R. 1365-1366) from which the state engineer issued its proposed 
determination in 1969. Under the adjudication procedures, GRCC had 90 days to protest this 
determination but which they did not. Therefore, the proposed determination becomes 
binding until such time that it may be set aside by a court. U.C.A. 73-4-11. 
An adjudication provides the state [engineer] an opportunity to assure that water use 
is restricted to beneficial use and thereby protect unappropriated water. Huntsville Irr. Ass 'n 
v District Court of Weber City, 72 Utah 431, 439, 270 P. 1090 (1928). Accordingly, if 
GRCC was concerned, or claimed an additional 20 cfs as a "carrier" 
Page -29-
right, its opportunity to do so was in that adjudication. This court has strictly construed the 
90 day protest period, even to the detriment of a party complaining of lack of actual notice. 
Jensen v Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1992). Here, GRCC has never alleged it was unaware 
of the adjudication, rather its tact is to attempt to obtain by contract water rights not afforded 
it by the State, by means of failing to include the State at all, a principle rejected in the 
Huntsville, supra, case. 
GRCC maintains here, as below, this case is simply a contract issue of private rights. 
Thayn argued unsuccessfully below, at summary judgment, that, no, this is a question of 
public rights, as all water use is public and not private. U. C. A. § 73-1-5. As was noted in 
Huntsville, supra at 442, "it is not so much what the court said, but what it actually did", 
Here, while the court said it was simply ruling on the contract, what it did was to afford a 
"water right" to GRCC, unlimited by any duty, of 20 cfs more in flow than accorded GRCC 
by the State and to take away from Thayn 200 cfs non-consumptive water right during the 
irrigation season and all 600 cfs in the offseason. All of this was done despite GRCC's 
failure to protest its own water right as allocated by the state engineer, failure to protest in 
GRCC alleges a "carrier or sluicing" right is long established in Utah law. (Aplee. 
Brief, pp.4, 28), citing Jackson v Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co., 120 Utah 509,235 P.2d 918 
(1951). However, Jackson involved a case where "no other party to this action claims a right to 
use this water so the award was made without contest.". Id at 510. Moreover, even absent a 
contesting party this case was remanded to this district court for specific determinations as to any 
"additional amount, if any, required under the present system in order to make the water 
conveniently available without unnecessary waste". Id. at 512. Here, however, GRCC has never 
filed for a non-consumptive carrier use. Should they do so, they would bear the burden of 
proving such carrier right was "without unnecessary waste", U. C. A. § 73-3-21. In any event, 
Thayn's non-consumptive power right has priority over sluicing. U.C.A. § 73-3-8(1). 
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the general adjudication, failure to protest Wilson's water right application for 600 cfs, and 
failure to protest Wilson's 1981 change application for year round use o the 600 cfs power 
right.. At each stage GRCC had an affirmative duty to protest; at each stage it declined to 
do so. GRCC did not even record or take any action to put persons on notice of the 1952 
amendment. Rather, GRCC kept the 1952 amendment secret until after the power plant was 
built and then seeks to extort profits of another's labor, capital and ingenuity by means of 
the secret document. 
The elements necessary to invoke equitable estoppel are a statement, admission, act 
or failure to act by one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted, reasonable action or 
inaction by the other party taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act or 
failure to act, and resulting injury to the second party if the first party were allowed to 
contradict or repudiate the statement, admission, act or failure to act. Orton v Utah State Tax 
Com % 864 P.2d 904 (Ut. App. 1993). 
Here, Thayn' s conduct was abundantly reasonable. Thayn, an innocent purchaser for 
value, receives a title report disclosing the original 1952 agreement, but because of lack of 
recordation, has no knowledge of the 1952 amendment. The water rights of GRCC are on 
file. The water rights of Wilson are also on file, and are amended, without protest by GRCC, 
to allow for year round use of Thayn's existing 600 cfs. Thayn first negotiates for a large 
scale hydroelectric project, which would require use of additional land of GRCC and 
modification of the raceway. Under that agreement, GRCC will be compensated for its land 
by means of a 1% royalty over and above the 600 cfs water right of Thayn. When that 
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project fails, Thayn begins looking at a more economical smaller scale project, which, as the 
court found, did not evolve into a firm plan to build until 1990 (R. 1659, ]f 2). At any time 
prior to this, in its own water right application, in the adjudication, in the original perfected 
water right of Wilson, or in the 1981 change application converting that to year round use 
for power generation, GRCC had only to disclose its position that it would hold Wilson to 
400 cfs and all of the present litigation and $300,000 expenditure on the power plant would 
have been averted. But no, Wilson was a "good ole boy", so it was okay with GRCC. 
Thayn, apparently not a good ole boy, doesn't deserve the same rights according to GRCC. 
However, having sat on their rights this long, GRCC should be estopped, or found to have 
waived, or at a minimum latches should apply to bar and preclude the unconscionable 
conduct of GRCC.30 As a matter of law the Court should reversed the ruling of the trial court 
on estoppel, waiver and latches or, at a minimum, should direct remand and retrial on the 
issue applying the proper burden of proof. 
(c) GRCC's claim of unclean hands is without basis in fact. 
GRCC argues in its brief that Thayn's injury was of his own making and/or that 
Thayn has unclean hands. (Aplee Brief pp. 50-54). GRCC first argues that Thayn's claim 
for latches fails because they assert any failure was due to Thayn's own fault and not to 
30
 On page 37 GRCC argues that Thayns equitable defenses are based on the fact that 
GRCC should have filed an action for anticipatory repudiation of the contract. No citation to the 
record below, or to the appellant's brief is made for this proposition. This is a red herring of 
record proportion. Thayn's theory was that the equitable defenses of estoppel, latches and 
waiver apply because GRCC never asserted, never recorded, never raised, never even revealed 
the 1952 amendment in any water right establishment, either their own or that of Wilson, or in 
any manner asserted such right prior to the building of the co-generation facility. 
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GRCC. Their first argument is that Thayn needed to refurbish his pump house in any event. 
However, that argument fails to address the fact of why Thayn would put in additional hydro 
electric turbines to generate electricity that he can neither use nor sell at this point. This 
argument insults the intelligence of the reader and needs no further elaboration. 
Their second argument is Thayn has unclean hands and is not entitled to any equitable 
relief. (Applee brief pp. 52-54). The basis of this argument is GRCC's supposed belief that 
Thayn made misleading statements. However, they cite to no statements of truth in the 
record other than an alleged statement of Leon Thayn to Dean King in 1987 or 1988 that 
Thayn had no plans at that time to generate power. Each of the statements they recite were 
completely rebutted.31 As was acknowledged in the original brief, Tim Vetere, a current 
board member of GRCC, himself acknowledged that he had gone to the pump house in 1989 
and talked with Leon Thayn who told him they were putting generators in to generate power. 
(R. 1902, V. 1., pp. 220-223). Vetere was the vice-president of GRCC at the time and was 
aware that Thayn was going to sell power. {Id 224). However, his understanding was there 
was an agreement with the canal company regarding the generation of power for sale. {Id 
228). Moreover, GRCC was more than aware by virtue of the 1981 change application of 
Wilson, which sought to change the 600 non-consumptive water right from irrigation season 
only to year round use. GRCC knowingly waived any right to protest because Wilson was 
31See response to Statement of Fact 33, infra. 
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"a good ole boy". GRCC's attempts to say that Thayn somehow concealed his intentions to 
generate electricity during the construction of the hydro electric plant is wholly contrary to the facts, 
but moreover contrary to the admissions and acknowledgments of GRCCs own agents. GRCC is 
a company which can only act through its agents. (See citations noted in Appellee's brief footnote 
55). 
POINT 6. The trial court improperly excluded evidence on the maintenance of the 
raceway. 
GRCC makes two arguments in this regard. First, that the raceway only need have 
capacity of 515 cfs under the 1952 agreement and, secondly, that the issue of maintenance 
was somehow subject to a second proceeding. Addressing the second issue first, while there 
was a second action filed, same was not against GRCC, but individual shareholders 
thereof.33 But the fact was, whatever may have been in the action between Thayn and GRCC 
shareholders individually, Thayn in this case had specifically raised maintenance as an 
affirmative defense and specifically denied that any of the alleged problems in receiving 
Dean King, GRCC board member from 1970 to 1988 acknowledged that he knew from 
the size of the pump house renovation that it would be used to generate electricity. (R. 1902 
V.l, p. 96). Further, GRCC's ditch rider from 1987 to 1989, Clinton Thompson also testified 
that he knew Thayn was putting in electrical generation facilities. (R. 1902, V.l, p.31). Even 
counsel for GRCC admits, despite its contention of unclean hands, that the pump house and 
facilities were being refurbished with the capacity to generate electricity. (Appellee brief 
p.42-43). Blaine Silliman, vice president and later president of GRCC throughout the plant 
construction, not only knew of the construction, but actually helped build it. 
33In fact, the court said that it "assumed" that the maintenance issue was in the other suit. 
The court had never seen the other suit and the only thing it knew was what counsel had told 
the court. The court had specifically avoided reading anything contained in the other lawsuit. 
(R. V.l, p.81,L. 6-10). 
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water claimed by GRCC were the result of Thayn's actions. Rather, Thayn alleged it was 
a result of the failure to maintain the raceway. (R. 258, ^[15). Said answer to the 
supplemental complaint states in relevant part "and specifically avers that if Green River was 
at any time unable to receive the 80 cfs of water to which it has priority, that failure was due 
to Green Rivers own failure to property maintain the diversion works, the raceway, and its 
own canal, and was not in any way attributable to the acts or omissions of Thayn". 
Unquestionably, Thayn timely raised the issue of maintenance of the raceway either as a 
direct denial of the allegations of difficulty in receiving water asserted by GRCC, or as a 
specific affirmative defense, and the issue was properly preserved. In response to the Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, Thayn asserted in his third affidavit that: 
"At no time, in 1986 or otherwise, has there been insufficient 
water available at the dam and at the head of the raceway to 
satisfy the requirements of both the Plaintiff and me. The 
problem has been entirely with the Plaintiff and its 
representatives. They have wholly failed to properly maintain 
the dam and diversion works as required by the 1952 agreement 
so that the rate of flow to sustain the needs of both the Plaintiff 
and myself could be satisfied. Specifically, they have refused, 
despite my repeated requests, to close the gates on the west end 
of the dam to permit an increase in the flow into the raceway. 
In fact, they have locked them open with chains and locks so 
they could not be closed by anyone else to increase the flow into 
the raceway, even when the flow in the river has been low. 
More importantly, they have refused in spite of my urgent 
requests to clean out the raceway so more water could reach the 
power house and the head of Plaintiff s irrigation canal. In fact, 
they have refused my repeated requests that I be permitted to 
clean out the raceway at my own considerable expense". 
Thus, the pot has indeed attempted to call the kettle black once again. GRCC created 
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any alleged lack of flow problems it may have had34 by both diverting waler at the head of 
the raceway back to the river35 (for no known reason whatsoever) and by failing to clean the 
raceway to allow sufficient flow. This leads us back to their first argument, that GRCC need 
only provide 515 cfs in the raceway. This ignores the common fact and knowledge that 
Thayn and GRCC depend on both the flow and head pressure provided by the dam and 
raceway. The head available at the inlet to the raceway is directly proportional to the flow 
of the river. In order to maintain and deliver the flow and head to the foot of the raceway, 
the raceway must be kept clean and free of obstructions. (R. 1895, pp. 106,203-205). This 
head pressure is what causes Thayn5s turbines to produce power and wetter to flow into 
GRCC's ditch. By opening the head gate at the top of the raceway, and by refusing to clean 
or in any manner maintain the raceway, (R. 1895, pp. 37-40; 79) GRCC can assure that it 
creates a shortage of water, upon which to complain in this action. It is GRCC who acted 
with unclean hands. It is GRCC who acted in bad faith. It is GRCC who wrholly refused to 
honor its contract to maintain the facilities, and then attempts to blame Thayn for its own 
folly. GRCC's arguments to the contrary are more than just intellectually dishonest but 
border, if not completely encroach, upon false representations to the court. In any event, the 
court made no factual findings that Thayn acted with unclean hands and 1his argument is 
without proper basis from the trial court below for which GRCC could argue on this appeal. 
34However, all actual measurements taken show GRCC exceeding its stale approved 
maximum flow rights by 9 to 40 cfs in its canal. 
35Addm 2 shows the slide gate at the head of the raceway. (Ex. 17). 
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POINT 7. GRCCs conduct entitles Thayn to costs and attorney's fees under 
U. R. A. P. Rule 33. 
As shown previously, Thayn did preserve each and every one of the issues raised in 
this case for appeal, with the exception of the public policy issue, which was adequately 
explained by counsel it is initial brief. GRCCs request for attorney's fees should be denied. 
On the other hand, Thayn should be awarded his attorney's fees under U.R.A.P. Rule 33 
inasmuch as Thayn has had to go to great costs and expense controverting the false facts 
cited to in the record by GRCC, as well as pointing out all of the facts attempted to be 
introduced into evidence in GRCCs brief, but for which there was no evidence in the lower 
court. Such conduct is without basis in fact or law and Thayn should be awarded his 
attorney's fees and costs. 
THAYN'S RESPONSE TO GRCCS CROSS APPEAL 
Point 1. The trial court properly denied litigation expenses not proper under 
U.R.C.P. Rule 54 in GRCCs claim for wrongful injunction. 
However, GRCC fails to attach copy of the orders from which it appeals. U. R. A. P. 
Rule 24(a)(l 1)(C). The trial court ruled that the trial costs recoverable under Rule 65(a) are 
the same as those contemplated under Rule 54(d)(1) and as further refined by Frampton v 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).36 GRCC argues that Mountain States Tel. & Tel Co. v 
Akin Wright and Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984) for the principle that damages 
36GRCC failed to attach as an addendum a copy of the order from which it appeals. See, 
U.R.A.P. Rule 24(a)(1)(c). 
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included in defending a wrongful injunction may include attorney's fees. GRCC then 
analogizes that such damages could also include additional costs not allotted under Rule 
54(d)( 1). However, as GRCC acknowledges, the Mountain States case was denied under the 
prior Rule 65(a). The legislature has now amended that Rule to provide for a recovery of 
attorney's fees and costs. Thus, the legislature has spoken to the matter. If the legislature 
intended damages to include costs other than those allowed ordinarily under Rule 54, it 
would have so spoken. To allow, as GRCC argues, that any costs not legally recoverable 
under 54(d) can then be shifted into "damages" is a slippery slope and obviates the limitation 
of costs as this Court has elucidated under Rule 54. GRCC cannot sneak in through the back 
door of "damages" that to which it is legally not entitled to take through the front door of the 
courthouse. The ruling of the trial court below should be affirmed.37 
Point 2. The trial court properly denied judgment on the third cause of action for 
failure of the Plaintiff to put on evidence of any profits. 
GRCC does not contend that it put in any evidence of any profits earned by Thayn 
in response to the third cause of action. There was no evidence submitted at the summary 
judgment level, nor was any submitted at trial. GRCC attempts to point to one of Thayn's 
proposed trial exhibits, (GRCC brief, p. 64 ref. R. at 1547) as an attachment to its Motion 
for Entry of Judgment on its third cause of action filed August 11,2000. However, this was 
after trial had been consummated. Moreover, such document was never admitted. Finally, 
37Again it should be emphasized that the trial court found the 40 foot wall to be an 
obstruction to the free flow of water to Thayn, (R.624) which violates U.C.A. §73-1-15, and 
ultimately was found to have been constructed on Thayn's property. (R. 1691). 
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said document does not show profits of $289,500.17. Said exhibit shows a "Summary of 
Lost Production" caused by the lack of maintenance on the raceway. Plaintiff further 
misconstrues the difference between gross profits and gross revenues. 
In Combe v Warren's Family Drive-ins, 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984) this Court 
has held that a trial judge is not privileged to determine matters outside the issues of the case, 
and if he does, findings will have no force and effect. In Combe, unlike the present case, the 
issue was neither plead nor tried. In the present case, while the Plaintiff may have an 
argument for pleading, the fact of the matter is that it was never tried. The Plaintiff, for 
whatever design, purpose, or intention, failed to put on any evidence at trial as to any 
damages or lost profits. Had the Plaintiff raised the issue, Thayn's evidence would have 
shown that there were no profits obtained. However, because the Plaintiff did not go 
forward with its case in chief, Thayn had no standing to attempt to rebut same. It is error to 
adjudicate issues not raised before or during trial and unsupported by the record, Combe, 
supra at 736. This is true whether the action sounds in law or equity. Id in Wineglass 
Ranches, Inc. v Campbell, 473 P.2d 496, 500-01 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) the court took much 
stock in the Plaintiffs failure to raise a claim not only at trial, but also at the pretrial 
conference. Id at 500, stating, "[Plaintiffs] attorney's attended a full dress pretrial 
conference at which the necessity of all parties stating all claims to be adjudicated was 
strongly emphasized". (See also Leonard Farms v Carlsbad Riverside Terrace, 599 P.2d 
In fact, such revenues are not contained in the unadmitted document. It only shows 
kilowatts generated, and not the price thereof. 
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411, 413(N.M. 1997)(a party may not split his demand and prosecute it piece meal, or 
present a part of the grounds upon which such cause of action is founded and leave the 
remainder to be presented in a subsequent suit if he first fails). 
Plaintiff simply has no evidence of any "profits" of which to disgorge.39 Even if there 
were evidence of such profits, the ruling of the trial court at summary judgment would be 
error as a matter of law. Green River's original Motion for Summary Judgment sought 
judgment that (1) The agreement and amendment are unambiguous and enforceable against 
Defendant's breach (R. 94); (2) Green River is entitled to an order of specific performance 
(R. 96); (3) Green River is entitled to an injunction (R. 99); and (4) Green River's third and 
fourth causes of action are not barred by Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-7. (R. 100). Thus, when 
the court stated that it was granting summary judgment on the third and fourth causes of 
action, what the trial court was in fact ruling was that Thayn's claim for eminent domain did 
not preclude the third and fourth causes of action. In essence, it was granting summary 
judgment against Thayn on the issue of eminent domain, but not granting summary judgment 
for Plaintiff establishing that they had shown their third cause of action to be recoverable. 
GRCC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment sought judgment under its eighth and ninth 
causes of action (R. 363) and under trespass (R. 365). Thus, no where in the record did 
GRCC specifically move for judgment on the third cause of action. The first ruling of the 
trial court was one of granting partial summary judgment, again, only on the issues raised 
Rick Raster testified at trial that the hydro electric facility was in fact not generating 
any profits. (R. 1902, V. 9, p.196). 
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before it. The second summary judgment ruling of the trial court was on the eighth and ninth 
causes of action. GRCC simply misconstrues the action of the trial court and attempts to 
elevate a ruling which precluded Thayn's affirmative defense/counterclaim of eminent 
domain as being a bar to Plaintiffs third cause of action, to an actual judgment upon the 
third cause of action. This case, like Combe, supra, involves claims not presented at trial and 
not litigated. The judgment of the trial court precluding Plaintiffs third cause of action was 
proper. 
GRCC next attempts to argue that the trial court's rulings were inconsistent with its 
prior ruling. However, when one looks at the relief actually sought by GRCC in its original 
motion for summary judgment, it is apparent that GRCC sought only a ruling that Green 
River's third and fourth causes of action were not barred by U. C. A. § 73-3-1. The trial 
court then granted GRCC the relief which it had requested, namely a ruling that Thayn's 
claim for sovereign immunity would not preclude the third and fourth causes of action. 
Nowhere in the record does it appear that GRCC actually submitted evidence as to liability 
or damages or actually sought any further ruling on the third cause of action. Nowhere at 
trial did GRCC submit any evidence or argue its third cause of action. Only after trial, did 
GRCC attempt to raise the issue. This is piece meal litigation within the edicts of the Combe 
case and is improper. 
In any event, as Thayn's own exhibit shows, there were no profits. The operations 
of the pump house have been deducted at a loss. Had there been a hearing, Thayn would 
have shown that until the higher rate of pay under the contract with Utah Power had kicked 
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into effect, the operation of the hydroelectric facility would have been at a loss. By the time 
the higher kilowatt rate came into effect, this action had pursued, and Thayn has been stayed. 
Accordingly, there are no "profits" of which to disgorge. Further action on this issue would 
be a nullity. 
The Court has long held canal owners cannot recover the economic benefit of another 
water user's rights. In Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 P. 
584 (1911), affd 239 U.S. 323 (1915), Tanner had obtained the right to divert a quantity of 
water from the Provo River. He intended to convey the water through an existing canal, 
lengthen the canal and rent the water to those who would settle the newly developed area -
a purely speculative, for-profit venture. In Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 
Utah 126, 121 P. 592 (Utah 1911), decided on the same day as Tanner, the city sought to 
divert Jordan River water through the irrigation company's canal, which, because of its 
higher elevation, could service much more of the Salt Lake valley than could the older city 
canal, thereby saving Salt Lake City significant construction costs. 
In both instances, the second user based its claim of a right to use on the statute now 
numbered Section 73-1-7. In both cases, the principal question was the measure of damages. 
In Tanner, the Utah Supreme Court made a number of pertinent holdings, as follows: 
(1) The burden of proving damages is on the owner of the canal or ditch, not upon the 
second user. 121 P. at 589. The measure of damages is the extent to which the existing 
canal or ditch is rendered less valuable to the owner by the second use. Id. It is immaterial 
whether the second user will profit, because the canal owner "cannot recover for any benefit 
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respondent may receive." Id. The canal owner has no better right than anyone else to apply 
for the right to appropriate water and convey it through the canal. Consequently, even 
though the second use might preclude the owner's use of the canal for future diversions that 
might be approved in the future, that preclusion is not compensable. If and when the owner 
obtains the right to make additional appropriations, he can again enlarge the canal. 121 P. 
at 591. 
In Tanner, the canal company could not show that the second use of the canal 
diminished the canal's value to the company. Therefore, only nominal damages were 
awarded. 
In the East Jordan Irrigation case, the canal owner argued that the city's second use 
of the canal constituted a constitutional "taking," and that the appropriate measure of 
damages was the value of the second use to the city. The trial court and jury accepted that 
argument at least in part, for although the jury found that the irrigation company's use of the 
canal would not be impaired by the city's second use, it nonetheless awarded the irrigation 
company substantial damages. 
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that the canal owner was properly compensated 
when the owner receives compensation for whatever damages, 
if any, he sustains by having the use he is making of the 
property interfered with. If the owner continues in the 
possession and use of his property. . . . and where there are no 
additional costs or expenses incurred in either the use of 
maintenance of the property... then we can see no escape from 
the conclusions that the owner can sustain only nominal 
damages, and cannot recover more. 
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121 P. at 588. The Court concluded 
[T]he question, under no circumstances, can be what the 
appropriator gained; but it is, what has he from whom the 
property is taken or in whose hands it is damaged lost, when 
such loss is expressed in dollars and cents? This is the question, 
and the only question, to be solved in this case. 
121 P. at 590. 
A much more recent case from Idaho, interpreting a statue virtually identical to 
Section 73-1-7, demonstrates the continuing vitality of the damage rules developed in the 
1911 Utah cases. In Canyon View Irrigation Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 619 P.2d 122 
(Idaho 1980), the canal company claimed that the proper measure of damages for the second 
use of its facility should be the amount the second user saved by not needing to build its own 
canal. The court rejected that argument, holding that damages must be measured by the 
canal company's loss of value, not by the second user's benefit. 619 P.2d at 132. 
Alternatively, the canal company argued that it should receive a portion of its original costs 
of construction. The court also rejected that argument, noting that the canal company was 
not being deprived of the existing system. So as was true in the Tanner case, the Idaho court 
said only nominal damages would be appropriate. 
For the foregoing reasons the ruling of the trial court on the third cause of action 
should be affirmed. Thayn should be awarded his attorney's fees under U. R. A. P. Rule 33 
inasmuch as the Plaintiffs claim in this regard is without basis in either fact or law. 
POINT 3. The Supreme Court upholds the lower court's findings of fact unless the 
evidence supporting them is so lacking that the Court must conclude the 
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finding is clearly erroneous. 
Even according to the marshaling submitted by GRCC, be it somewhat inadequate, 
that alone is clearly sufficient to uphold the court's finding in the regard that the wing wall, 
trash racks and radial gates are adjuncts and appendages to the pump house and pump house 
facilities. As can be seen from Plaintiffs exhibit 104, the south wall of the radial sluice way 
is the footing for the north wall of the pump house. In other words, absent the south wall of 
the sluiceway, the pump house would collapse. Moreover, the control mechanism by which 
the radial gates are raised and lowered has always been adjunct and appurtenant to the pump 
house facilities.40 The concrete is amongst the oldest on both walls as can be seen from 
exhibit 104. (Addm. 4). Further, the evidence was that, as taught by Wilson, the sluicing had 
always been done by Wilson, or Thayn. (R. 1902, V. 2, pp. 67-71) If GRCC believed the 
radial gates were its property, why then did it not take the time to man and operate and run 
the sluicing facility? 
While GRCC desperately tries to argue there is no evidence that the radial sluice gates 
existed in 1952, this statement mischaracterizes the testimony. The testimony was that the 
concrete comprising the radial sluice gates wash way was amongst the oldest of the concrete 
out there.41 Further, that sluicing was necessary on a regular basis in order to keep the 
40The Court actually visited the site on May 28, 1999. (R. 1902, V. 5, pp. 196-197; V. 6, 
p. 200). Addm 3 shows the radial gate structure is monolithic with the pump house. (Ex. 42, pp. 
1, 2, 4, 7; See also Ex. 104, addm. 4). 
41Ex. 85 shows that the newest portion of the pump house was built in approx. 1915. 
GRCC claims Rick Kaster stated that portions of the building were built after 1940. (GRCC's 
brief, p. 68). Their record citation is false. 
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raceway delivering water to both parties. Absent the radial gates, the raceway simply would 
not have functioned at the time the 1952 agreements were entered into. 
Additionally, GRCC failed to marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings. ^ 4 of the 1952 agreement provides in relevant part: 
The ownership, maintenance, upkeep, repair, supervision, 
control and operation of said diverting works situated upon the 
lands herein above described in If 2 shall be and remain with the 
second party. Each party agrees to keep the portion of said 
diverting works under its supervision in a state of reasonably 
good repair and condition so that insofar as the diverting works 
situated on the lands described in ffl| 2 & 3 respectively in this 
agreement are integral to or essential to the use, operation and 
enjoyment of the other party that the same will be maintained 
and kept in reasonably good repair and condition at all times. 
If the radial gates were not a part and parcel of the property being afforded to Wilson, 
then what portion of Wilsons is a "diverting works"?42 Certainly Wilson's pump house, 
trash racks and wing walls are solely used by Wilson and only for Wilson's benefit. The 
only possible "diverting work" that Wilson would be retaining under the 1952 agreement 
would be the radial sluice gates. As constructed, without the machinery and facilities of the 
pump house, the radial sluice gates cannot be operated. The finding of the trial court that the 
radial sluice gates were appurtenant to and a part of the pump house propeity is more than 
adequately supported by the record below. Thayn should have and recover his costs and 
attorney's fees for having to respond to the cross appeal pursuant to U.R.A.P. Rule 33. 
There was evidence GRCC mistakenly cost shared in a portion of the radial gate 
improvements. However, GRCC failed to cost share on the upper slide gate improvements. (R. 
1902, V. 4, p. 17). It is clear GRCC had no idea which diversion works it was claiming 
ownership to until the court's ruling below. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the trial court on its summary 
judgment of the interpretation issues and in granting judgment on Plaintiffs eighth and ninth 
causes of action. The injunction entered should be dissolved. In the alternative, the Court 
should find as a matter of law that GRCC is estopped, has waived, or is otherwise precluded 
by latches from asserting its contractual issues. The Court should also hold that the contract, 
as interpreted by Judge Bryner, violates public policy, particularly the water law statutes. 
The Court should rule that the trial court erred in disallowing Thayn from raising his 
maintenance issues and, at a minimum, remand for new trial allowing those issues to be 
raised. The judgment of the trial court against Plaintiff on its third cause of action for lost 
profits, and against Plaintiff on the issues of trespass and the radial sluice gates should be 
affirmed. Defendant should be awarded his costs and attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED this ^ ^ d a y of March, 2002. 
STEVEN A. WUTHRICH 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on t h e o * ^ day of March, 2002 I mailed two correct copies of the 
foregoing brief to the following: 
J. Craig Smith 
Nielsen & Senior 
60 East South Temple, Ste. 1100 
P.O. Box 11808 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)532-1900 
FAX (801) 532-1913 
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S T A T E OF U T A H 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES R. SOPER REEO RICHARDS 
Solicitor General Chief Ooputy Attorney General 
February 25, 2000 
J. Craig Smith 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
P.O. Box 11808 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84147 
Re: Water User's Claim (WUC) No. 91-294 for 
Green River Canal Company 
Dear Craig: 
I appreciate your patience in awaiting my response to your 
letter sent last fall. You inquired whether the State Engineer 
would be willing to amend the proposed determination in the pending 
Price River general adjudication with regards to WUC No. 91-294. 
Particularly, would the State Engineer agree to eliminate the 
footnote which describes the 20 cfs flow for domestic and 
stockwatering as part of the 60 cfs flow for irrigation. 
I have conferred with both Bob Morgan, State Engineer, and 
Mark Page, Southeastern Regional Engineer. The State Engineer 
stands by the recommendation made to the court with regards to WUC 
No. 91-294 as set forth on page 1143 of the Proposed Determination, 
Area 91, Book No. 5. The State Engineer found tnat the 2 0 cfs is 
part of the 60 cfs flow for irrigation. The 60 cfs flow was 
sufficient then and is sufficient now for the described beneficial 
uses and the delivery system. Even at a flow rate of 60 cfs the 
flow duty is an astronomical 24 acres/cfs. 
Moreover, the 60 cfs flow rate was apparently not a problem 
for the Company when the proposed determination was issued. No 
objection was filed against the proposed determination by the 
Company with regards to the 60 cfs flow rate. It was not until the 
recent litigation between the Company and Lee Thayn that the 
Company filed an objection to the 60 cfs flsw rate in 1999. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
Letter to J* Craig Smith 
February 14, 2 000 
PAGE TWO 
The State Engineer understands that WUC No. 91-294 was looked 
at by the court in the recent Thayn litigation. But while the 
right was looked at# it was not adjudicated. It seems the Thayn 
case is adjudicating private agreements entered into in 1952. One 
agreement simply recognized that the Company was claiming an 80 cfs 
flow in its diligence claim. The fact that 80 cfs was claimed in 
the agreement was admitted to by Thayn. The adjudication of 91-294 
did not occur in the Thayn case in which the State Engineer was not 
a party, but occurred in the general adjudication with the State 
Engineer after the 1952 private agreements were entered into. 
For the above reasons, the State Engineer does not agree that 
WUC No. 91-294 should be amended in the general adjudication. 
However, Bob Morgan, Mark Page and I are willing to meet with the 
Company, Lee Thayn and their designated representatives to further 
discuss this matter and the associated issues. Should the parties 
be willing to do so, please let me know so arrangements can be 
made. 
Sincerely, 
JOHN H. MABEY, JR.U 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Bob Morgan, State Engineer 
cc: Mark Page, Southeastern Regional Engineer 
cc: Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
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January 07, 1992 Annual Stockholders Meeting 
Green River Canal Company 
The annual stockholders meeting of the Green River Canal Company was called to order on 
January 07, 1992 7:15 pan- at the Green River City Hall. President, Blaine Silliman conducted 
the meeting. 
tfinutes of the Stodd»lders meeting on January 08, 1991 were read by Secretary, Judy Scott. 
Gene Dunham made a motion to accept the minutes as read. Dean King 2nd. Motion carried. 
A count of the stock represented was taken. There were 1423 shares present with 955^ shares 
proxy for a total of 2378% which made a quorum of stock. (Total stock out 4158/half=2079). 
New discussion referring back to old problems referred to in the minutes. Homer Davis questioned 
what had been done on the leakage problem on his property. Blaine & Tim said they had walked the 
ditch to check (while water was out of ditch). Ted also checked it as well. At.Homer's suggestion 
to talk with some other people who were somewhat £amdLliar with the property, he talked with Dick 
Bedier & Tom Hastings. They said they never had a problem with ouskrats. Ted suggested to dig a 
ditch with a hackhoe and drain, but at looking at it further thougjbt there must be a spring under 
the slewy area. Ted doesn't believe it is the canal company's responsibility. Ted suggested 
closing headgate and putting dye to see if it would come up there. Mjch discussion by all parties 
present. Sec. Judy Scott read a letter from Atty, George Harmond dated 7-13-91 to Elaine Coates/ 
Homer Davis regarding problem. Ebmer did not thitfk this resolved any of the problem. Dean King 
suggested a backhoe go in and dig along ditch and see if they can find muskratt hole/holes. Ted 
suggested whole board and any interested stockholders go look at problem and see if they could 
come up with a solution. Homer asked if they were going to attempt to correct this or wait until 
spring, then get sued. Appearing to have no resolution or agreement as to the exact cause of the 
problem or how to solve the situation at this time, the board agreed to gp look at the area with 
Har*1* *t a time designated by him. 
Thgre was discussion about the flooding problems which occurred this past sumner which affected 
Don Acerson and others. Ted noted that he and Blaine had tried to get Emery County to include 
some funds from the Emery County budget, but they did not include any funding. The county had 
referred them back to the city and the city had also requested some help, <ibut the county did not 
include any flood money. Ted noted, hefd like to build the bank vp on the hi^ ht side which 
might help. Adding that if the trees, etc. on the old 92 ditch could be taken out maybe the 
flood area could be allievated at least to a lesser degree before it gets to the canal. Consid-
erable discussion on the problem and various theories on the resolution of them. 
Blaine mentioned that the Financial Statement was being passed around for their review and 
approval. Homer asked why the usage of Ted's cat versus the canal cxxnpany's cat. Ted responded 
saying that they had to cut out some large tress with long roots and the canal company's cat 
has the sloper and would not have worked as well for what was needed. He had approval of all 
board members prior to doing work. 
Sue Folsom ask about cementing the ditch, wondering if that would be feasible as it would 
eliminate some of these other problems. Discussion followed. Basicly it would be too costly 
was the fibaal conclusion. 
John Vetere asked about the canal being sprayed for weeds. He said the County man told him 
the canal co told him not to come and spray. Blaine said he had called them and they told him 
they would only be able to do 1/3 of it at $1600, and the canal co. would have to pay the other 
2/3fs. Additional discussion, John Vetere said they told him they would do it for only $500. 
Secretary will write a letter to the County and get costs, dates, etc. in writing. 
Blaine called for the election of one three (3) year board memebr to be elected to replace Bill 
Caffee who goes off the board. Homer Davis nominated Bob Quist, 2nd by Gene Dunham. Gene asked 
that nominations cease and Bob Quist be placed in office by acclamation. All in favor. 
157 
Blaine Asked for approval of the Financial Statement. Gene Dunham made motion to approve. 
John Powell 2nd. Unanimous. 
Ted noted to the stockholders that the cat needs some repairs and he will do in the 
spring if there is no opposition. Noting that one of the items is a pin. John Vetere 
said it needs a flapper put on it. Ted said the tailgate needs to he extended. No 
further discussion. 
fGene Dunham asked about the raceway and the status with Tbayns* on power plant. Same discussion by stockholders who were there when Cdnrrittments were made as to canal co.'s 
( status. Need to review previous agreement and update if needed. Judy referred to 
minutes for the 3/14/89 meeting when Leon Thayn was present. Gene Dunham and Clell 
Duncan said they had discussed this with Leon at a Soil Conservation Meeting recently 
and he indicated the first couple of years would he very costly but the 3-5 year pericx} 
should have some revenue. Indicated that a cent and a half is what tflB&L will pay. 
Ted said there was question on cleaning the raceway. Everyone stressed to clean it on 
the west side. 
Judy said she had finally gptten ahold of George Barmond, Atty. from Therald Jensen's of fie 
Therald has retired, all the files for canal co. are in that office and available to him. 
He will still be on retainer for the $500 a year fee. Stockholders agreeds. Judy also 
noted that Geo had told her the admendment thought to be passed last year at stx>ddbolders 
meeting was not passed. The reason being, the adBendement requires a 2/3 majority of the 
stockholders and not just a majority of the stx>ckholders. The admendment had only a 
majority and not a 2/3's majority. 
The meeting was adjourned at 8:40 p.m. ^46&^ 
THP following board members prpent at the meeting 1-07-92 
were: Blaine Silliman, Ted rodepj-, Edward Hansen, Tim 
Vetere and Judy Ann Scott. 
J. Craig Smith, 4143 
David B. Hartvigsen, 5390 
D. Scott Crook, 7495 
Scott M. Ellsworth, 7514 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross Appellant 
Green River Canal Company 
FILED 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JAN 2 9 2002 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a Utah 
Mutual Water Company, 
Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross Appellant, 
v. 
LEE THAYN, 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross Appellant. 
Errata Sheet 
Utah Supreme Court Number 
20010357 SC 
Appellee/Cross Appellant, Green River Canal Company, by and through its counsel of 
Record, submits the following errata sheet on its Brief of Appellee/Cross Appellant, filed 
January 16, 2002, in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Page 
23 
Correction1 
End of first full paragraph: 
".. . to utilize the diversion and conveyance facilities owned by 
GRCC It does not convey " 
1
 Additions are underscored; deletions are stricken. 
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1 46 
57 
57 
67 
1 67 
First sentence of the second paragraph: 
" . . . duties imposed upon him by his predecessor s contract with 
GRCC By so doing, the trial court " 
Last sentence of the second paragraph: 
" . . . to learn every particular of the arrangements between Wilsons 
and GRCC. Thayn, however, admittedly . . . . " 
Blank record citation should read 
"(R. at 1-2, fU 2, 5-7; 23-24, t l 2, 5-7; 1897, 14:24-15:6; 1902, v.4, 
70:1-71:16; Addm.F, UK 2-4.)." 
In the middle of the sole full paragraph: 
" '. . . power generation on a year-around [sic] basis.' (Brief R. at 990, 
18-)" 
First sentence of the final paragraph: 
". . . $9,866.50 of the requested amount be paid to GRCC It excluded 
five hours . . . ." 
First sentence of the first full paragraph: 
"In light of the foregoing, Green River GRCC, pursuant to . . . ." 
Second sentence of the second paragraph: 
"The raceway and diversion dam are owned by GRCC. The Wilson's 
interest in the pump house . . . ." 
First sentence of the last paragraph: 
"According to the 1952 Agreement, Green River GRCC was to 
convey . . .." 
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70 First sentence of the second paragraph: 
". . . according to the 1952 Agreement, Green River GRCC was to 
convey . . . . " 
76 Signature block: 
"Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant, Green River GRCC Canal 
Company" 
DATED this 3 ^ " day of January 2002. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C. 
i^^tlL^^ 
J. Craig Smith 
David B. Hartvigsen 
D. Scott Crook 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J& "day of January, 2002, two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Errata Sheet were mailed, by first-class United States mail, to 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
1011 Washington, Suite 102 
Montpelier, Idaho 83254 
<r ^KM^^> 
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